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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1989 term, the Supreme Court decided two cases1 relat-
ing to the burden of proof under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 the Court made a significant
change in the allocation of the burden of proof that litigants must bear
in certain types of employment discrimination cases. In a plurality
opinion, the Court broke with past precedent in the employment dis-
crimination area4 by shifting the burden of proof away from the Title
VII plaintiff in "special" cases involving "mixed motives." In cases
where a Title VII plaintiff can prove that an improper or discrimina-
tory factor5 played a substantial role in making an employment deci-
sion, the new burden-shifting mechanism may come into play.6
This "shifting burden" is a departure from the standard practice in
Title VII employment cases. In the past, "mixed motive" cases did not
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). In Wards Cove, the majority adopted the plurality
rule in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), which held
that the employee must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times in a
disparate impact case. However, an employer need only prove that it had a "legit-
imate business reason" to make its employment decision to rebut statistical proof
of discrimination. Wards Cove would have been overturned by §§ 3 and 4 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990. See H. R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 12-
24.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000h-6 (1982). This statute will be referred to hereinafter as
Title VII. When referring to Title VII, this Article will be focusing on the provi-
sions prohibiting employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982).
3. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
4. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)(in an
employment discrimination action brought pursuant to Title VII, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the
defendant only bears the burden of explaining the nondiscriminatory reasons for
its action); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)(the bur-
den of persuasion never shifts from the Title VII plaintiff). However, outside of
the scope of "mixed motive" cases, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework
remains untouched. See Ingram v. Missouri Pac. . Co., 897 F.2d 1450,1454 & nA
(8th Cir. 1990); Ottaviani v. State University of New York at New Paltz, 875 F.2d
365, 370 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1989); Jindal v. New York State Office of Mental Health,
728 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-77 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Hill v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
729 F. Supp. 1071, 1073-74 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
5. Improper or discriminatory factors include an individual's race, color, sex, reli-
gion or national origin as stated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). This type of
criteria will be referred to hereinafter as "illegitimate or discriminatory factors"
and their application by an employer will be referred to as an "improper motive."
6. Although Price Waterhouse was a plurality vote, Justice O'Connor's fifth and
deciding vote would require a Title VII plaintiff to prove that a discriminatory
factor was a substantial factor in making an employment decision before the bur-
den-shifting mechanism can come into play. See supra notes 84-98 and accompa-
nying text. Congress has proposed to alter this role in "mixed motive" cases,
favoring a showing that an improper motive was a contributing factor in an em-
ployment decision. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 4.
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give rise to a separate method of factfinding under Title VII. Prior to
Price Waterhouse, the Title VII plaintiff bore the burden of proof 7
throughout the litigation. Upon a showing of a prima facie case of
disparate treatment,8 the burden of production shifted to the em-
ployer to demonstrate that there was a legitimate business reason for
the employment decision.9 This formula presented problems for
"mixed motive" plaintiffs. In a situation where legitimate and illegiti-
mate factors played a role in an employment decision, the employer
had, by definition, a legitimate business reason for making the deci-
sion. Therefore, the Title VII plaintiff was left with the burden of
proving the hidden motivations underlying employment decisions.
The new formula adopted by the Court for "mixed motive" cases
has created a new mechanism for litigating certain types of employ-
ment discrimination claims. This factfinding mechanism is based on
the formula created by the Court in Mount Healthy City School Dis-
trict v. Doyle.10 This test was developed to deal with the difficult
problem of factually proving which of several factors motivated an
employment decision. The Mount Healthy formula has been applied
in numerous areas of the law in which intentions and motivations play
a key role.ll
7. The burden of proof is comprised of the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion. See J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2485, 2487 (3rd ed. 1940).
The burden of persuasion, being a much higher hurdle to get over in the course of
litigation, is the critical component of the burden of proof. In discussing the allo-
cation of the burden of proof in Title VII cases, this Article will focus on who
should bear the risk that persuasion will not be achieved (risk of non-persuasion).
Therefore, references to the "burden of proof" are directed at the duty to per-
suade the factfinder that a party to an employment discrimination suit has proved
the case in chief or the required elements of an applicable defense.
8. The term "disparate treatment" refers to a situation where similarly situated in-
dividuals are treated differently. Such a situation gives rise to a claim under Title
VII where the party receiving less favorable treatment is a protected person for
the purposes of the statute. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986)(if
a black employee regularly receives a smaller paycheck than a simxilarly situated
white employee, he may have a cause of action under Title VII). See also E.E.O.C.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)(stating that an employment
discrimination case based on disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory
intent while the theory of disparate impact requires no such showing); Royal v.
Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 655 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1981), on remand,
549 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
9. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973)(the plaintiff al-
ways bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in actions under Title VII).
10. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
11. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)(applying the Mount Healthy stan-
dard in an equal protection case that challenged a prisoner disenfranchisement
statute in order to determine the motive behind the legislation); NLRB v. Trans-
portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983)(applying the standard to mixed
motivation cases in the unfair labor practice area); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 & n.21 (1977)(applying the
Mount Healthy test to determine the intent of the legislators in passing on a zon-
1990]
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In Mount Healthy, a tenured teacher was fired by his employer, the
school district.12 Although there were many legitimate reasons for
firing Doyle, including an altercation he instigated in the school
lunchroom over the size of a serving of spaghetti, his letter of termina-
tion indicated that the school board was upset over Doyle's disclosure
of a confidential memo and his criticism of board policy. Therefore,
one factor that motivated Doyle's dismissal was the fact that he exer-
cised his right of free speech.13
The Court sought to protect the constitutional rights of employees
without allowing them to place a stranglehold on their employers by
wrapping themselves in their first amendment rights. A balance had
to be struck between the employee and the employer. The Court
sought to protect the employer's right to make legitimate personnel
decisions while protecting the constitutional rights of employees. The
Court used the allocation of the burden of proof in "mixed motive"
cases as the method by which the motivation underlying the employ-
ment decision could be proven. Therefore, the Court held that in such
cases the burden of proof shifts to the employer, requiring her to show
that the same employment decision would have been made absent the
improper motive after the plaintiff shows that such a factor played a
role in the employment decision.14
One area in which the Mount Healthy standard has received con-
siderable use has been the area of labor law. In determining whether
union animus motivated the termination of an employee, the National
Labor Relations Boardl5 has adopted the Mount Healthy standard in
"mixed motive" cases arising under section 8(a)(3) of the National La-
bor Relations Act.16 The Board adopted the standard in its decision,
Wright Line, Inc..17
Wright Line, like Price Waterhouse, dealt with the adoption of a
ing issue); North Mississippi Communications, Inc. v. Jones, 874 F.2d 1064 (5th
Cir. 1989)(applying the Mount Healthy standard to a civil rights case brought by a
newspaper against a county board based on the county board's motivations in
withdrawing its legal advertising). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 &
n.13 (1982)(referring to the Mount Healthy standard in a discussion of the neces-
sity of determining the board of education's motivations in pulling books off of
school shelves for the purpose of a suit brought under § 1983).
12. Mount Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-83 (1977).
13. Id. at 283-84 & n.1.
14. Id at 284-87.
15. The National Labor Relations Board will be referred to hereinafter as the
"NLRB" or "the Board."
16. The National Labor Relations Act will be referred to hereinafter as the NLRA.
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1989). The current ver-
sion of the Act reflects the original language of the Wagner Act and the amend-
ments made pursuant to the Taft-Hartly Act. See C. MoRnis, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAw 182-83 & n.7 (2d ed. 1983).
17. 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). The Wright Line test was approved of by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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system to determine the real motivation underlying an employment
decision. Both of these cases dealt with a situation where certain rea-
sons for making an employment decision were statutorily impermissi-
ble. In each of these cases, legitimate and illegitimate concerns
surrounded an adverse employment decision. Also, there are signifi-
cant similarities between the statutory schemes governing each case.
Even though the NLRA protects representative groups rather than
individuals,18 and the remedies available to the parties differ under
the respective statutes, the general goals of these two statutes parallel
one another.
This Article will discuss the language and purposes of Title VII,
followed by an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse. The reasoning of the plurality opinions will be synthe-
sized to determine the current rules under which Title VII plaintiffs
must operate. Based on this analysis, the state of the law under Title
VII will be presented.
The Wright Line testl 9 will serve as an analytical tool to determine
whether the rule of Price Waterhouse will effectuate the purposes of
Title VII. Comparing the two statutory schemes involved in the re-
spective cases will demonstrate that they serve significantly similar
functions. Through this process, it can be determined whether the
rule of Price Waterhouse was a necessary change in the law under
Title VII, whether it can promote the purposes of the statute, and
whether future changes, such as those proposed by the Civil Rights
Act of 1990,20 will be necessary to realize the promise of equal oppor-
tunity employment.
18. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982) with 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3)(1989)(it is an un-
fair labor practice for an employer to discriminate with regard to any term or
condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization).
19. Morris has explained the Wright Line test as follows:
The initial focus under Wright Line is on the elements of the General
Counsel's primafacie case .... that is, the existence of protected activity,
knowledge of that activity by the employer, and union animus. Proof of
these elements by the General Counsel warrants at least an inference
that the employee's protected activity was the motivating factor in the
adverse personnel action and that a violation of the Act has occurred. To
rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case, the employer must
demonstrate that the same personnel action would have taken place for
legitimate reasons regardless of the employee's protected activity. In
this regard, the employer has both the burden of going forward with the
evidence and the burden of persuasion.
C. MoRRs, TEim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 79-80 (1982-86 supp.)(citations omitted).
20. The Civil Rights Act of 1990 would have explicitly adopted the concept of "mixed
motive" discrimination. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 4 ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment prac-
tice is established when the complaining part demonstrates that race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin was a contributing factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also contributed to such practice.").
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II. THE LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF TITLE VII
In the pertinent part, Title VII states that "[iut shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or
discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 2 ' This language represents only a small part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.22 The Act was created to enforce the
civil rights of all Americans in a number of areas including voting
rights, access to accommodations, and equal opportunity in employ-
ment. This particular language was intended to attack discrimination
in private employment23 just as the fifth and fourteenth amendments
attacked such discrimination in the public sector.24
There is no single answer as to how Congress intended to combat
the problem of discrimination in private employment. Clearly, the
language of Title VII prohibits a private employer from making em-
ployment decisions because of his reliance on an illegitimate factor
such as race or sex. However, what degree of reliance on such criteria
is prohibited? The plain language of the statute is not self-explana-
tory in this regard. Therefore, the question arises as to whether the
statute was intended to strictly prohibit all consideration of illegiti-
mate factors in making employment decisions or to merely provide a
remedy to those subject to actual discrimination upon proof of exclu-
sive reliance upon such factors by the employer.25 The operation of
Title VII must lie somewhere between these two extremes.26
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1989).
22. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 will be referred to hereinafter as "the Act."
23. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2391.
24. The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o state shall... deny any person
within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend I.
While the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, it contains the
due process clause which has been used to combat discrimination. See Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364 (1974). Both constitutional provisions protect citizens
against official governmental action which constitutes discrimination at the state
or federal level. See also Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp.
806, 808 & n.3 (M.D. Ala. 1989)(stating that a state employee's employment dis-
crimination claim was governed by Title VII and the fourteenth amendment as
enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
25. Compare Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987)(if plaintiff shows dis-
crimination was "a" motivating factor in making an employment decision, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove that it was not a determinative factor)
with McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir.
1987) (employee bears the burden of showing that an illegitimate factor was deter-
minative in making an employment decision).
26. Congress could not have intended to prohibit all consideration of gender in mak-
ing employment decisions. It specifically provided that gender may be a bona fide
occupational qualification. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1982). On the other hand,
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The statute sets forth "a congressional declaration that all persons
... have an equal opportunity for employment," free from employ-
ment decisions based on discriminatory criteria.27 This emphasizes
that, at a minimum, improper motives must play an actual role in
bringing about the challenged personnel decision. However, Congress
could not have intended to bind the hands of employers by requiring
them to give special treatment to persons protected by Title VII.28 In
fact, Congress specifically authorized reliance on an otherwise dis-
criminatory factor where that criterion is a bona fide job qualifica-
tion.29 Therefore, while the general goal of the statute is the
elimination of discrimination in the private workplace,30 Congress in-
tended to balance this goal against the employer's legitimate interests
in running his business.
The "balance" Congress intended to strike between these two in-
terests is evidenced by the concept of causation in Title VII actions.
3 1
An employer can only be held liable under Title VII if he makes an
adverse employment decision based on an improper motive. While in-
terpretations of this language have varied in the past,32 the legislative
history of the provision sheds much light on its meaning. Early in the
requiring the Title VII plaintiff to prove the exact factors motivating a subjective
decision-making process would be nearly impossible. Such an interpretation
would render the statutory prohibition a nullity. See infra, note 59. Also, em-
ployers are generally in a position of economic power with respect to employees.
Title VII was intended to even the playing field by forcing employers to focus on
legitimate factors in making employment decisions. See Fragante v. City of Hon-
olulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989).
27. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADnm. NEws 2391, 2401.
28. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Court interpreted the em-
ployment discrimination language of Title VII. The Court stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII ... to guarantee a job to every per-
son regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that
every person be hired simply because [that individual] was formerly
[subjected] to discrimination or... [was] a member of a minority group.
Id. at 430-31.
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1989). See also Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago,
803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986)(having a Jesuit presence in the philosophy depart-
ment was reasonably necessary to the operation of a private Catholic university,
and was therefore considered a bona fide occupational qualification). But see
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)(the bona fide job qualification excep-
tion to the general prohibition against sex discrimination was intended to be ap-
plied in an extremely narrow fashion).
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
31. The concept of causation was in many ways the central subject of the argument
between the parties in Price Waterhouse. See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief at 21-22,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)(No. 87-1167).
32. Compare McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir.
1987) cert. denied 485 U.S. 914 (1988)(a finding of liability under Title VII requires
a clear causal relationship between the employment decision and the discrimina-
tory motive) with Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985)(en
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drafting of the statute, a proposed amendment to the Act that would
have restricted its application to employment decisions based solely on
an illegitimate factor was rejected by Congress. 33 Therefore, Con-
gress' conception of the causation requirement of Title VII anticipated
the eventuality that decisions based on "mixed motives," a combina-
tion of the protected interests of the employee and the employer,
could come within its statutory prohibitions.
However, it is unclear whether protecting the employer's interest
in making legitimate business decisions is really of equal importance
to protecting employees from discrimination. While employers have
been given narrow exemptions from the prohibitions on considering
illegitimate factors in making employment decisions, an employer
may not generally rely on discriminatory factors in making an em-
ployment decision. The narrow area where employers may utilize ille-
gitimate factors as a reason for an employment decision evidences the
secondary nature of congressional concern for the employer's freedom
of decision under the statute. In other words, Congress intended to
tilt the balance which it perceived to exist disproportionately in the
employer's favor toward the employee while preserving employer in-
dependence through its narrowly crafted exceptions from the prohibi-
tions of Title VII.
Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the primary purpose of
Title VII is to protect employees from discrimination by providing
them a remedy for being subjected to discriminatory employment
practices. This primary purpose is only tempered by a concern that
there be a causal link between the improper motive of the employer
and the adverse personnel decision. The concept of causation assures
employers that they will not be punished for making an employment
decision merely because the employee involved was a protected per-
son.3 4 The statute protects the employer from strict liability under
Title VII when making decisions affecting protected persons, while as-
suring that there is a remedy for the victims of discrimination in the
private workplace.
banc)(an employer can be found liable under Title VII if a discriminatory motive
played some role in the personnel decision).
33. See 110 CONG. REc. H2728 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. S13,838 (1964). In fact, Senator
Case, the Republican floor leader for the bill, suggested that this amendment
would render the employment discrimination provision of the statute almost
useless.
34. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). In fact, the courts that
have applied the new evidentiary rules under Price Waterhouse continue to take
special care to preserve employer autonomy in employment decision cases. See
Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st Cir. 1989).
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III. PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS - A NEW THEORY OF
CAUSATION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Facts
Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at the nationally recognized
accounting firm of Price Waterhouse. At the firm, an individual be-
came eligible for partnership when all of the partners in that person's
local office submitted his or her name as a candidate. In 1982, Hopkins
was a candidate for partnership, the only woman of the eighty-eight
candidates that year.35 "Forty-seven of these candidates were admit-
ted to the partnership, 21 were rejected and 20 - including Hopkins -
were 'held' for reconsideration the following year."36
The partners in her office clearly felt that Hopkins was well quali-
fied for membership in the firm when she was first proposed for part-
nership.3 7 Many partners and the clients she dealt with felt that her
manner was assertive and professional. However, her aggressiveness
sometimes manifested itself as abrasiveness. There was also evidence
that her manner occasionally created a great deal of tension at the
office. This too was noted by partners in the firm, fellow workers, and
clients.3 8
Although there were legitimate concerns about Hopkins' interper-
sonal skills, several partners considered her gender as a factor in mak-
ing their decision regarding her candidacy for partnership. Some
partners made comments that Hopkins did not act in a "lady-like"
manner. "One partner described her as 'macho'; another suggested
that she 'over-compensated for being a woman'; a third advised her to
take 'a course at charm school.' Several other partners criticized her
use of profanity."3 9 The partner who was responsible for telling Hop-
kins that her bid for membership in the firm had been placed on hold
advised her to "walk more femininely, have her hair styled and wear
35. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781 (1989).
36. Id.
37. At trial, Judge Gesell described Hopkins' role in obtaining a sizable contract with
the Department of State as a 'key" role, and stressed that no other candidate for
partnership had an equivalent achievement to his credit. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985) aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (1987), cert granted Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins 485 U.S. 933, rev'd Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
The endorsement by the partners in Hopkins' office stated: "Ann Hopkins per-
formed virtually at the partner level for the U.S. State Department. While many
partners were "involved" with the client, State Department officials viewed Ann
as the project manager." Respondent's Brief at 3, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)(No. 87-1167).
38. See Petitioner's Brief at 7-11, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989)(No. 87-1167)(discussing individual examples of Hopkins' abrasive manner).
39. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1782 (1989).
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jewelry." 40
At trial, a social psychologist, Dr. Susan Fiske, testified that the
partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was influenced by
factors that could be considered a form of "sex stereotyping." She
pointed out that such factors were not only represented by comments
directed at Hopkins' gender, but neutral criticism directed at her by
individuals who barely knew her.41 There was other evidence that
previous partnership selections were directly dependent on sex-based
criteria.42 In previous years, it was revealed that one partner felt that
all women were unqualified to attain membership with the firm.4
3
B. The Lower Court Opinions
At trial, Judge Gesell noted that Price Waterhouse admitted that
Ms. Hopkins was well qualified for partnership, but for the complaints
about her interpersonal skills. According to the court, she was quali-
fied for the position, rejected for partnership, and her employer con-
tinued to consider other employees for partnership after the decision
was made.44 Therefore, Hopkins presented a prima facie case of dis-
crimination under Title VII. The issue in the case, as the court saw it,
was whether the concern over Ann Hopkins' interpersonal skills was
merely a pretext for an employment decision based on gender.
While its posture as a pretext case under Title VII appeared to be
clear, Judge Gesell broke new ground by characterizing it as a case
involving "mixed motives." The court found that there were legiti-
mate reasons for turning down Ms. Hopkins' request for partnership.
However, it was also apparent that some of the comments submitted
by the partners at Price Waterhouse were the product of sex stere-
otyping. Furthermore, substantial reliance was placed on those
comments.
40. Respondent's Brief at 8, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)(No.
87-1167). Ultimately, Ann Hopkins was elevated to partnership by order of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 2349 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1989).
42. Id. See also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)(female candidates for partnership were viewed more favorably if they acted
more femininely).
43. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1989).
44. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985). See also
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253-54 (1981)(plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)(plaintiff must prove that he was qualified for the
job, that he was rejected despite his qualifications and his employer continued to
seek applicants after the rejection).
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As a case of disparate treatment, the action brought by Ann Hop-
kins required a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of her
employer.45 Such intent could be inferred by the consideration of ille-
gitimate factors in making the employment decision. While the court
was convinced that concerns about Hopkins' interpersonal skills were
legitimate, it found that a discriminatory factor influenced her em-
ployers' decision.46 Therefore, the court found that Price Waterhouse
had an improper motive in turning down Ann Hopkins' bid for part-
nership. However, the court stated that Price Waterhouse could avoid
equitable relief by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have placed Ann Hopkins' partnership application on hold ab-
sent its reliance on illegitimate factors. When Price Waterhouse failed
to carry this burden, the court entered judgement for the plaintiff.47
On appeal, Price Waterhouse challenged the factual findings of the
trial court as to the presence of sex stereotyping and the degree to
which the partners relied on these comments in making the employ-
ment decision in question. However, the court of appeals found ample
evidence in the record to support the factual findings of the trial court
in these areas. 48
Price Waterhouse also challenged the district court's finding of dis-
crimination based on the factual evidence, i.e., the presence of sex
stereotyping. Price Waterhouse argued that there wasn't a sufficient
45. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1118 (D.D.C. 1985). See also M.
PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIBNATION LAw § 5.40 (1988)(discussion of the Mc-
Donnell Douglas analysis of disparate treatment).
46. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1118-19 (D.D.C. 1985).
47. However, the fact that Ann Hopkins resigned her position upon learning that it
would be unlikely that she would attain partnership limited the relief to which
she was entitled. The statute states that it is an unlawful employment practice to
discharge an employee for an improper motive. Although an individual can qual-
ify for relief under Title VII by arguing that a resignation was, in reality, a con-
structive discharge, the plaintiff failed to carry her burden in this regard.
Therefore, she was only entitled to back pay for the period after her bid for part-
nership failed and her resignation. Id. at 1120-21.
48. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,468 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert granted, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 485 U.S. 933 (1988), rev'd, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989). The standard of review as to factual determinations is "clear
error." A trial court is given great deference by a reviewing court since the re-
viewing court only has the written record before it, and the factfinder was able to
view the presentation of the evidence and testimony. Therefore, the acceptance
of sex stereotyping as competent evidence of discriminatory intent by a trial court
may place a key element of a Title VII action beyond the review of the higher
courts. See C. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL CouRTs 479-82(3d ed. 1983).
This treatment of sex stereotyping was not unusual for the Court. The Court
had previously used evidence of sex stereotyping as proof of invidious intent in
discrimination cases. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702,707 (1978)(the Court held that employment decisions cannot be
predicated on mere stereotyped impressions about characteristics of males or
females).
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causal relationship between so-called sex stereotyping and the part-
nership decision to support the judgment below. Noting that the cir-
cuits were split on the issue, the court rejected the contention that the
evidence, i.e., the presence of sex stereotyping did not in fact motivate
the partnership decision.
Adopting a "but for" causation requirement under Title VII would
place an impermissible burden on a Title VII plaintiff.49 The court
rejected the contention of Price Waterhouse that a Title VII plaintiff
must show that the employer's consideration of a discriminatory fac-
tor was the cause of a personnel decision.5O The court felt that forcing
a Title VII plaintiff to prove that a different employment decision
would have been made by an employer, after proving that the decision
was motivated in part by gender, would be damaging to the purposes
of Title VII. Therefore, the court approved the burden-shifting mech-
anism adopted below. However, the court reversed with regard to the
type of liability that an employer could avoid by meeting this "shifting
burden." The court held that an employer could avoid all liability by
showing clear and convincing evidence that the same employment de-
cision would have been made in the absence of the illegitimate factors
that played a role in the process.5 '
C. The Price Waterhouse Plurality
1. The Brennan Opinion
As the Court of Appeals noted, the circuits were split as to the cau-
sation requirement under Title VII.52 The Supreme Court attempted
49. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50. In rejecting the "but for" test of causation, the court rejected the views held by a
number of circuits with regard to the meaning of Title VII. See, eg., Lewis v.
University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915-17 (3rd Cir. 1983); Mack v Cape Eliza-
beth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977). See also Knighton v. Laurens
County School Dist. 56, 721 F.2d 976 (4th Cir. 1983)(holding that "direct evidence"
of discrimination brings the burden-shifting mechanism into play).
51. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This is consis-
tent with the position taken by the Reagan Administration with respect to what
type of liability could be avoided by showing that the same employment decision
would have been made without reliance on discriminatory factors. See H. R. REP.
No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 25. Traditionally the federal circuits held
that an employer could avoid all liability by meeting the shifting burden. See, e.g.,
Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1984).
This would have been changed by § 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 which pro-
vided that an employee could only avoid equitable remedies by meeting the shift-
ing burden under Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
4.
52. See Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners, 857 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1988)(proof that
an improper factor played a "significant" role in an employment decision consti-
tuted a per se violation of Title VII); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council,
830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987)(discriminatory motive must be the "but for"
cause of the employment decision); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir.
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to deal with this split by granting certiorari in the case. While Price
Waterhouse produced no majority opinion,53 the case has produced a
new mechanism for adjudicating Title VII cases involving employment
decisions based on "mixed motives." The Price Waterhouse decision
has reallocated the burden of proof among Title VII litigants. The im-
portance of this decision is based on the fact that the burden of proof is
instrumental in determining whether enough factual evidence was
presented to meet the causation requirement under Title VII.
Unlike the courts below, the Brennan opinion did not treat the
case as if it was based on a theory of disparate treatment.54 There was
no extended discussion of discriminatory intent in making the part-
nership decision in question. Rather, the Brennan opinion, and the
concurring opinions of Justices White and O'Connor, addressed the
question of causation under Title VII by recharacterizing the case as
one of "mixed motivation."
55
The Brennan plurality focused on the causation requirement of Ti-
tle VII. The opinion stated that "but for" causation was a hypothetical
construct. Justice Brennan stated that the critical inquiry under Title
VII was not whether an illegitimate factor was the "but for" cause of
an unfavorable employment decision. Rather, the proper question
was whether an improper motive played some role in the decision
making process. The critical time period for making such a determi-
nation would be the point at which the decision was made.56
Congress only intended to obligate the Title VII plaintiff to prove
that the employer relied on a discriminatory factor in making his deci-
sion. The rejection of the idea that the consideration of an illegitimate
factor must be the "but for" cause of an employment decision to sub-
ject an employer to liability under Title VII was based on the logical
1985)(en banc)(discriminatory motive must have played "some part" in the em-
ployment decision); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir.
1985)(the employment decision was more likely than not motivated by a discrimi-
natory motive); Knighton v. Laurens County School Dist. 56, 721 F.2d 976 (4th
Cir. 1983)(causation proved by "direct evidence" of discrimination shifts the bur-
den of proof to employer).
53. The Court was split with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens
joining one opinion, and Justices White and O'Connor concurring in the judg-
ment. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Scalia dissented.
54. As a matter of fact, only the dissenters treated the case as a straight application of
the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct.
1775, 1806 (1989)(Kennedy, J. dissenting).
55. See Kandel, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Trails Blazed, Males Fazed, or Merely
Mazes Raised?, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 101, 105 (1989)(by characterizing the case
as a "mixed motive" case, the Court was able to cast aside the McDonnell Douglas
framework and look to Mount Healthy for guidance). See also Ingram v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 897 F.2d 1450 (8th Cir. 1990)(treating the case under the Burdine
framework because it could not be characterized as a "mixed motive" case of the
type at issue in Price Waterhouse).
56. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (1989).
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proof problems associated with the concept.57 Such an interpretation
of the words "because of" in the text of the statute58 would make it
almost impossible for an employee subjected to discrimination to
prove a "mixed motive" case. "But for" causation, as Justice Brennan
characterized it, could not mean that a Title VII plaintiff must factu-
ally isolate the cause of an employment decision. This would be nearly
impossible in a multiple causation case. With respect to the multiple
causation problem, Justice Brennan stated that "[u]nless we can iden-
tify at least one of [the causal factors] as a but-for cause of [an event
there] may not [be] any 'cause' at all."59 Therefore, Justice Brennan
argued that Congress only intended to require a Title VII plaintiff to
prove that an employer relied on an illegitimate factor in making an
employment decision to show that the statute has been violated.
However, the Brennan opinion did not end its analysis with the
discussion of the employee's interest under Title VII. Justice Brennan
also emphasized the idea that the statute was designed to assure em-
ployers that they would not be punished for making legitimate busi-
ness decisions affecting protected persons. The opinion pointed to the
existence of the "BFOQ ' 60 exception as evidence of the congressional
concern over forcing employers to make business decisions without re-
gard to an individual's qualifications for the job in question.
Brennan concluded that a Title VII plaintiff can prove a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination by demonstrating that discriminatory crite-
rion was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision.
After the plaintiff has proven her case in this manner, the burden of
proof would then shift to the employer. The employer would be able
to avoid liability by showing that the same decision would have been
made regardless of the consideration of illegitimate factors. Justice
Brennan stated that "[t]his balance of burdens is the direct result of
Title VII's balance of rights." 6 '
The Brennan opinion argued that this approach did not conflict
57. The "but for" causation concept was vigorously argued by Price Waterhouse as
the proper standard to be applied in the case. See Petitioner's Brief at 24-26, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)(No. 87-1167). The arguments of
Price Waterhouse were not persuasive in this area because the Court had previ-
ously rejected the idea that the words "because of" in the statute required a
showing that an illegitimate factor was the sole motivation underlying an em-
ployment decision. See McDonnell v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,282
n.10 (1976).
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1786 (1989).
60. The term "BFOQ" stands for bona fide occupational qualification. See supra note
29. However, the Brennan opinion failed to point out that the "BFOQ" defense
has from its creation, been subject to intense scrutiny and restrictive application.
See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
61. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1788 (1989). This assertion also
reflected the reality that almost "every Title VII disparate treatment case will to
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with the holding in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine.62 Under the rule proposed by the Brennan plurality, the plain-
tiff in a "mixed motive" case would bear the burden of persuasion on
the issue of whether the employer relied on an illegitimate factor in
making an employment decision. Therefore, the plaintiff would bear
the burden of proof as to his primafacie case under the new analytical
framework. What would be altered by the new test would be the
method by which the plaintiff could meet the burden of proof within
the meaning of Burdine.6 3 Brennan characterized the employer's bur-
den as an affirmative defense.64
Turning to the case at bar, Justice Brennan refused to question the
trial court's finding that "sex stereotyping" constituted competent evi-
dence of an improper motive on the part of Price Waterhouse.65 The
opinion stated that it didn't take expert testimony to determine that
the comments solicited from the partners were based on gender.
Therefore, the presence of a discriminatory factor justified shifting
the burden of proof to Price Waterhouse.
Justice Brennan suggested that this burden could'be met by show-
ing objective evidence that the same decision would have been made in
the absence of the illegitimate factor. Price Waterhouse had to prove
that a legitimate factor was the likely motivation underlying the deci-
some degree entail multiple motives." Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae at 6, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)(No. 87, n.67).
62. 450 U.S. 248 (1980). There, the Court held that the Title VII plaintiff bore the
burden of persuasion throughout a case based on disparate treatment. Id. at 254.
63. The opinion stated that it was merely looking to other developed areas of the law
to deal with the problem of proving which factor motivated a decision in a "mixed
motive" situation. This problem was not addressed in Burdine. However, the
Court had developed such a body of caselaw pursuant to the Mount Healthy deci-
sion. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1788 (1989).
65. This may be a particularly important development in the law of employment dis-
crimination. Since a majority of the members of the Supreme Court refused to
question the competence of sex stereotyping as evidence of an improper or dis-
criminatory motive, the trial courts will likely be able to take a deeper look at
employers' records to discover hidden attitudes toward protected persons. Be-
cause of the nature of the appellate standard of review as to findings of fact, these
actions by the district courts may well become nearly unreviewable in the future.
See supra note 48. Cf. Gray v. University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, 883 F.2d
1394, 1400-01 (8th Cir. 1989)(finding of the district court that there was no credi-
ble evidence constituting direct evidence of discrimination was not clearly errone-
ous so the court did not apply the Price Waterhouse test).
In support of considering "sex stereotyping" as evidence of employment dis-
crimination, Justice Brennan stated.
An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose posi-
tions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
Catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they
don't. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1791 (1989)(Brennan, J.).
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sion. Justice Brennan suggested that the reason articulated by the
employer should, standing by itself, justify the decision that was made.
Furthermore, he stated that the employer should be in the position to
produce objective evidence to meet his burden under this frame-
work.66
With respect to the magnitude of the employer's burden, the Bren-
nan plurality disagreed with the clear and convincing error standard
applied below. The preponderance of the evidence standard is the typ-
ical burden of proof in civil actions. In other areas of the law where
"mixed motive" circumstances have justified the burden-shifting
mechanism, the Court had also adopted the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard.67 Since Justice Brennan felt that the wrong standard
was applied below, with two justices concurring, the case was re-
manded on the issue of the employer's burden of proof.
2. The Concurring Opinions
a. The White Opinion
In a short concurrence, Justice White found it unnecessary to go
into a lengthy analysis of the purpose of Title VII. To the contrary,
Justice White found the facts of the case to warrant a clear application
of the Mount Healthy standard. He found it unnecessary to determine
whether the Mount Healthy concept of causation would comport with
the concept of causation under Title VII. Because this was a "mixed
motive" case, it was clearly distinguishable from Burdine and McDon-
nell Douglas.68
Pursuant to the Mount Healthy model, the burden of proof would
shift to the employer upon a prima facie showing of a violation of
Title VII by the employee. Justice White stated that the employee
could make such a showing by presenting evidence that an illegitimate
factor played a substantial role in motivating an employment decision.
Then, the burden of proof would be properly shifted to the employer
to show that the same decision would have been made regardless of
the presence of the illegitimate factor.69
Justice White agreed with the Brennan plurality that the lower
courts applied the wrong standard with respect to the magnitude of
the employer's burden in a "mixed motive" case. He noted that the
Court in Mount Healthy applied the preponderance of the evidence
standard to the employer's burden. Justice White felt that the same
standard should be applied in the case at bar.
66. Id. at 1791.
67. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1792-93 (1989). See also Mount
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795-96 (1989).
69. Id.
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However, Justice White took issue with the Brennan opinion re-
garding the type of evidence employers should present to meet their
burden in "mixed motive" cases. He saw no special reason to force the
employer to produce objective evidence to meet this burden. Circum-
stantial evidence suggesting a legitimate reason for the employment
decision could be presented to meet the employer's burden of proof.
This would be particularly true, Justice White suggested, where the
employer presents credible testimony that the decision in question
was not the product of an improper motive.70
b. The O'Connor Opinion
While Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, she felt that
the mechanism adopted by the Court should be restricted by the
Court's previous decisions in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. She
strongly disagreed with the suggestion in the Brennan opinion that
the concept of "but for" causation was a hypothetical construct. She
viewed it as a serious concept defining the allocation of the burden of
proof under a statute which was designed to limit relief to actual vic-
tims of discrimination.
Justice O'Connor stated that legal concepts of causation had been
carefully developed over the years in the law of torts.7 1 Tort law rec-
ognized the unfairness of making a plaintiff prove "but for" causation
in a multiple causation case. This unfairness was mitigated by shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant upon a showing by the plaintiff
that the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff.72 The burden-
shifting mechanism did not hamper the policies underlying the law of
torts. Similarly, Justice O'Connor suggested that such a mechanism
would not upset the dual policies of Title VII, the protection of em-
ployees from discrimination, and the creation of a remedy for the vic-
tims of violations of the statute. However, she suggested that only a
showing by a Title VII plaintiff that an illegitimate factor played a
substantial role in an employment decision would justify shifting the
burden of proof to the employer.73
Turning to the causation requirement, Justice O'Connor stated
that an employer could meet his shifted burden of proof by refuting
the appearance of discrimination. This was justified because it was the
employer's consideration of an illegitimate factor that created this ap-
70. Id.
71. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1797 (1989)(O'Connor, J.).
72. Id. See also Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)(where two hunters
fired their guns and only the negligence of one hunter caused the plaintiff's in-
jury, the burden was shifted to them to prove that their actions did not cause the
plaintiffs injury); Restatement (Second) Torts § 433B (1965)(supporting the shift-
ing of burdens in multiple causation cases).
73. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1797-98 (1989).
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pearance in the first place. The concept of a shifting burden had been
employed in class action suits in the equal protection area. 74 The
Court has shifted the burden of proof in cases challenging the validity
of legislation in spite of judicial deference to the legislature in such
cases. Justice O'Connor concluded that Congress could not have in-
tended to grant more deference to private employers under Title VII
than it does the government when it presumes that the legislature acts
constitutionally.
Justice O'Connor admitted that the Court's previous decisions in
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine indicated that the Title VII plaintiff
should bear the burden of proof throughout the litigation. The deci-
sion by the Court in Price Waterhouse would clearly depart from that
rule. However, she suggested that such a departure was warranted
because of important distinctions between those cases and the case at
bar.
Previous disparate treatment cases were not predicated on direct
evidence of discrimination of the type presented by Ann Hopkins.75
The evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas was based on the
assumption that direct evidence of discrimination is hard to come by.
In Price Waterhouse there were legitimate reasons for rejecting Ann
Hopkins for partnership. However, there was also direct evidence
that the decision was the product of an improper motive.76
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor stated that the cases falling into
the category of the Hopkins suit were becoming more frequent. Prov-
ing that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the partner-
ship decision was about as far as she could take her case. There were
legitimate factors underlying the decision to balance against such
proof of discrimination, which placed the burden of proof on the Title
VII plaintiff under then existing law in all "mixed motive" cases. Jus-
tice O'Connor suggested that adopting the burden-shifting mechanism
was necessary to realize the promise of Title VII.77
Justice O'Connor suggested that the plaintiff must show that a dis-
criminatory factor played a substantial role in the employment deci-
sion to meet her burden to prove a primafacie case of "mixed motive"
under this test. She stated that stray remarks in the workplace, even
concerning an individual's race or sex, would not justify shifting the
burden of proof to an employer in a Title VII case. Even the testi-
74. Id. 1799-1800. See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)(upon a show-
ing that blacks had been systematically excluded from the grand jury process, the
burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that the selection criteria used were
racially neutral).
75. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 797 (1973)(the Equal
Opportunity Commission made no direct finding that the employer violated the
statute, its allegations were based on circumstantial evidence).
76. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1801-02 (1989)(O'Connor, J.).
77. Id at 1802.
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mony of an expert such as Dr. Fiske regarding the impact of discrimi-
natory comments, by itself, would not be competent evidence that the
case falls within the Price Waterhouse framework.78 The "substantial
role" or "substantial factor" requirement was seen as a part of the cau-
sation concept of Title VII. Justice O'Connor saw this as a necessary
element of the test for several reasons.
She saw the substantial factor requirement as a justification for de-
parting from the McDonnell Douglas standard. Strong evidence of an
improper motive would create a presumption that an employer dis-
criminated against its employee. This presumption would justify shift-
ing the burden of proof to the employer to rebut the presumption.
She also stated that the requirement would assure that stray com-
ments in the workplace would not give rise to "mixed motive" treat-
ment. Justice O'Connor concluded that "[w]hat is required [under
Price Waterhouse] is what Ann Hopkirqs showed here: direct evidence
that decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on improper
criterion in making their decision."
79
Because she anchored her opinion to the McDonnell Douglas
framework, Justice O'Connor stated that meeting the three-part test
of demonstrating qualification, rejection, and continued recruitment
by the employer would be a prerequisite to proving a case under Price
Waterhouse. She then stated that the Title VII plaintiff should pres-
ent any direct evidence of substantial reliance on discriminatory fac-
tors by the employer in making the employment decision in question.
At the same time, the employer should present its evidence of the le-
gitimate ground for the decision. Only then should a district court
judge decide whether to reallocate the burden of proof under McDon-
nell Douglas or Price Waterhouse.8 0
D. The Dissent
The dissenters argued that the plurality unjustifiably ignored a
complex set of rules for proving employment discrimination cases
under Title VII. The dissenters focused on the words "because of " in
the statutory language. They insisted that these words were intended
78. Id at 1804-05. In addition, Justice O'Connor recognized that illigitimate factors
always play a role in decisions because they are human characteristics of which
the decision makers are aware. Decision makers may discuss such characteristics
in a perfectly neutral manner without falling within the purview of Title VII. See
Mullen v. New Jersey Steel Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1534, 1551 (D.N.J. 1990).
79. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1840-45 (O'Connor, J. concurring);
Mullen v. New Jersey Steel Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1534, 1551 (D.N.J. 1990).
80. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1805 (1989). However, in applying
the test, some courts deal with the Price Waterhouse framework, as tempered by
Justice O'Connor's opinion, as an affirmative defense or an opportunity to avoid
liability by demonstrating its reasons for making the employment decision. See
Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 813 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
to create a "but for" causation requirement under Title VII. If it were
not for an employer's bad motive the employee would not have suf-
fered from an adverse employment decision1
The dissent vigorously argued that the case was controlled by the
McDonnell Douglas framework. There was no room in prior Supreme
Court precedent nor the language of Title VII for a special category of
"mixed motive" cases. The dissent concentrated on specific language
in Burdine that suggested that a "pretext" plaintiff could meet her
burden of proof by either circumstantial or direct evidence. Burdine
made no distinction, as Justice O'Connor did, between cases based on
the nature of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.82
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bore the
burden of proof throughout the litigation. The dissent pointed out
that the Price Waterhouse test was far more favorable to Title VII
plaintiffs. Therefore, the courts would be spending valuable time with
litigation, seeking to define "direct evidence" and "substantial factor."
However, the dissent stated that the overall impact of the decision
would be limited compared to the problems that it would raise in the
area of Title VII jurisprudence. The dissent concluded that a limited
number of cases would qualify for the Price Waterhouse analysis and
even fewer of those would be affected by the shifting burden of
proof.83
E. The Rule of Price Waterhouse
Because of the lack of a majority opinion in the case, the exact rule
of Price Waterhouse does not clearly appear in the opinions of the
Court. The Brennan opinion failed to garner a majority. Its view of
the burden-shifting mechanism was clearly the broadest of the three
opinions in the plurality.8 4 Therefore, while the Brennan opinion may
form a basis for determining the rule of Price Waterhouse, that rule
must be modified with the restrictions articulated in either the White
81. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1806-07 (1989)(Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
82. Id- at 1810-11.
83. Id. at 1812. The burden of proof only comes into play in those cases where the
weight of evidence on each side is even. The party with the risk of persuasion
loses in such an event. See S. GARD, 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 5.5 (1972). To some
extent, even in these cases in which the new rule could play some part the courts
have been eager to characterize the case as a non-"mixed motive" situation. See
Ingram v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 897 F.2d 1450 (8th Cir. 1989).
84. For example, the Brennan opinion would have only required that an illegitimate
factor play a "motivating" role in the employment decision to justify shifting the
burden of proof to the employer. The White and O'Connor opinions indicated
that such factors must be shown to have played a "substantial" role in the deci-
sion to reach the same result.
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or O'Connor concurrence.85
The basic rule articulated in the Brennan opinion is that the plain-
tiff in a Title VII action bears the burden of proving that an illegiti-
mate factor played a motivating part in an adverse employment
decision. Upon such a showing, the burden of proof shifts to the em-
ployer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have
made the same decision regardless of the presence of the illegitimate
factor. Justice Brennan further suggested that the employer must or-
dinarily meet this burden by producing objective evidence of the moti-
vation behind the decision.86
Justice White's formulation of the "mixed motive" case differed
from that of Justice Brennan in several significant ways. First, Justice
White was uncomfortable with the Brennan opinion's suggestion of
what would constitute a prima facie case of discrimination under
Price Waterhouse. He would require a Title VII plaintiff to show that
an illegitimate factor was a substantial factor in the making of the em-
ployment decision.87 Secondly, Justice White rejected the idea that an
employer would be required to produce objective evidence of his legiti-
mate motivation once the burden of proof was shifted in a "mixed mo-
tive" case. He suggested that this burden could be met by the
articulation of legitimate reasons for the decision. The burden could
also be met by the credible testimony of the employer that no discrim-
inatory factors motivated the employment decision.8 8
Justice White's position regarding the employer's burden of proof
in "mixed motive" cases would be particularly damaging to the rule
proposed in the Brennan opinion. He suggested that in a case where
the burden is shifted to the employer, that burden could be met by a
minimal presentation of evidence. The implication inherent in his
opinion almost obviates the very reason for shifting the burden of
85. Ironically, most courts struggling to apply the new rule have not picked up on
this distinction. Many courts are applying the rule articulated by the Brennan
opinion as if it were the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., Jindal v. New York State
Office of Mental Health, 728 F. Supp. 1072,1076 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Gibbs v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 714 F. Supp. 85, 89 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see Richardson
v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 813 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
There is even a split within the Seventh Circuit as to what rule to apply in
mixed motive cases. Compare Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d
1307, 1313 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989)(reh'g en banc denied)(stating that an illegitimate
factor need only play a motivating role to shift the burden of proof to the em-
ployer pursuant to Price Waterhouse) with Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989)(mixed motive treatment is justified when
the plaintiff presents direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substan-
tial role in the employment decision). Had the Brennan formula been the correct
one for either Justice White or O'Connor, they would have joined the majority
opinion.
86. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
proof to the employer in such cases. If the employer could meet his
burden by credibly articulating a legitimate reason for his decision, the
shifting burden would become a mere formality. Justice White's vote
is almost inexplicable. The evidentiary restrictions he would place on
"mixed motive" cases represent no change from the way such cases
would be treated under McDonnell Douglas. Therefore, under the
test proposed by Justice White, the employee would be stuck, as she
was before Price Waterhouse, attempting to prove that a discrimina-
tory factor was the sole cause of an adverse employment decision.8 9
Justice O'Connor, like Justice White, would restrict the application
of the "mixed motive" test to situations where an illegitimate factor
played a substantial role in the employment decision. While this re-
quirement is different from the "motivating role" standard articulated
by Justice Brennan, it does not seem to be a particularly serious depar-
ture from the test proposed by the Brennan plurality. Justice
O'Connor clearly suggested the "substantial factor" requirement be
included in the test because she thought that it would require a
stronger showing of discrimination by the Title VII plaintiff.90 The
substantial factor requirement seeks to assure a close nexus exists be-
tween the discriminatory factors considered by the employer and the
decision that was made. Similarly, Justice Brennan's concept of a
"motivating factor" is tied to the concept of causation under Title VII.
Therefore, although Justice O'Connor would require more substantial
evidence of discrimination to justify "mixed motive" treatment, this
suggestion would not render the Price Waterhouse framework a mir-
ror image of McDonnell Douglas.
Justice O'Connor did express several ideas that would curtail the
rule proposed by Justice Brennan. She suggested that the plaintiff's
burden of proof could only be met by direct evidence of discrimina-
tion. A Title VII plaintiff must show, by direct evidence, that her em-
ployer considered an illegitimate factor which played a substantial
role in the employment decision. While the requirement that the
plaintiff produce direct evidence does not seem imposing, Justice
O'Connor made it clear that she felt that future "mixed motive" cases
would require evidence of the type presented by Ann Hopkins.91 Fur-
89. By allowing an employer to meet the burden of proof in a Price Waterhouse type
case with such evidence, the analytical framework almost becomes a mirror im-
age of the existing McDonnell Douglas test. If this is so, then why would Justice
White suggest that the rule be altered in the first place?
90. Justice O'Connor's definition of the term "substantial" is never expressly
presented in the text of her opinion. However, support for the statement that it
represents a higher burden can be drawn from the fact that she emphasized the
term "substantial" with regard to assuring that the new mechanism would closely
follow the "but for" causation requirement under Title VII. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1798, 1803 (1989)(O'Connor, J.).
91. Justice O'Connor indicated that she felt that the documentary evidence of the
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thermore, evidence such as the testimony of Dr. Fiske as to the impact
of discriminatory comments at work, by itself, would not constitute
direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in
the decision making process. This is a far more restrictive view than
that taken by Justice Brennan who would have accepted any evidence
that both legitimate and illegitimate factors motivated an employment
decision as proof of the plaintiff's case under Price Waterhouse.92
The O'Connor opinion was in agreement with the White opinion in
most respects. Justice White made no mention of the requirement
that the plaintiff produce direct evidence that an illegitimate factor
was present in the decision making process to warrant "mixed motive"
treatment. However, Justice White's insistence that the consideration
of an illegitimate factor play a substantial role in the employer's deci-
sion in such cases closes the gap between these two positions. To meet
the higher burden of substantial reliance by the employer on an ille-
gitimate factor, direct evidence of such reliance would be more likely
to persuade a court to treat the situation as a "mixed motive" case.
Therefore, given Justice O'Connor's insistence of requiring the Title
VII plaintiff to produce direct evidence of discrimination, these two
positions do not differ in this respect.
While the rules proposed by Justices White and O'Connor do not
differ much in many respects, Justice O'Connor did not attempt to
alter the employer's shifted burden of proof in the manner proposed
by Justice White.93 Justice O'Connor would apparently not permit an
employer to meet his burden by merely testifying that the employ-
ment decision was not motivated by an illegitimate factor. While she
made several detailed statements indicating her disagreement with
the Brennan opinion, she made no comments about the suggestion
that an employer should be able to produce objective evidence to meet
motivation behind the employment decision spoke for itself. The partner's com-
ments, submitted for the very purpose of making an employment decision, were
based on an illegitimate factor. See Kandel, supra note 55, at 104.
92. In his opinion, Justice Brennan pointed out that Price Waterhouse admitted that
the employer in Tranportation Management discriminated against his employee
based on the evidence submitted in that case. However, no direct evidence was
presented that would have suggested that the employer bore a grudge against his
employee because of his union activity. Therefore, Justice Brennan clearly felt
that a Title VII plaintiff could meet the required burden to show that the case
should be analyzed under Price Waterhouse without direct evidence of an im-
proper motive. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775,1794 (1989). See also
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 396 (1983)(comments
by supervisor to fellow employee served as the basis to demonstrate that union
animus played a role, along with legitimate factors, in an adverse employment
decision).
93. Cf Note, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 57 U.S.L W 4469 (U.S. May 1, 1989) (No.
87-1167): Causation and Burdens of Proof in Title VII Mixed Motive Cases, 21
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 501, 534 (1989).
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his burden under the new rule. As stated earlier, this particular prop-
osition would be devastating to the reasoning underlying the decision
to shift the burden to the employer in the first place.94
Therefore, Justice O'Connor's position would be more compatible
with the Brennan opinion than that taken by Justice White. This
compatibility makes Justice O'Connor's vote the most probable fifth
vote for a majority on the court with regard to "mixed motive" cases.
It is the O'Connor opinion, therefore, that best articulates the rule of
Price Waterhouse.95 First of all, the Title VII plaintiff must meet the
three prong test of McDonnell Douglas.96 Then, as Justice O'Connor
stated:
[Tihe plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such
that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the decision was
made "because of" the plaintiff's protected status. Only then would the bur-
den of proof shift to the defendant to prove that the decision would have been
justified by other concerns.
9 7
The evidence to which Justice O'Connor refers is direct evidence of
the kind that Ann Hopkins presented in Price Waterhouse.98
IV. THE RULE OF PRICE WATERHOUSE AND THE
PURPOSES OF TITLE VII
The discussion in this Part will focus on the question of whether
the rule of Price Waterhouse will promote the underlying purpose of
Title VII. First, it will be necessary to find a sufficiently analogous
statutory scheme to use as a tool to analyze Title VII. Then, by look-
ing at cases that have developed in another area of the law it will be
possible to explore how such concepts as "direct evidence" and "sub-
stantial factor" would affect that area. This analysis will reveal
whether the rule adopted in Price Waterhouse was necessary and, if
so, whether the Court went far enough to assure that the promise of
Title VII will be realized. For the purposes of this analysis, section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA will serve as a comparative statutory scheme that
94. Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
95. See Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989).
96. Supra note 44 and accompanying text.
97. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1805 (1989)(O'Connor, J.). See also
Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp. 806, 813 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
98. While this would be the most logical articulation of the rule of Price Waterhouse,
most courts have failed to notice that the Brennan opinion did not garner enough
votes to constitute a majority of the Court. See Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1313 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989); Gray v. University of Arkansas at
Fayetteville, 883 F.2d 1394, 1398 (8th Cir. 1989); Waltman v. International Paper
Co., 875 F.2d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 1989); Gibbs v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York, 714 F. Supp. 85, 89 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Adams v. Frank, 712 F. Supp. 74, 76
(E.D. Va. 1989). But see Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp.
806, 813-14 (M.D. Ala. 1989).
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can be used as a point of reference from which to view the employ-
ment provisions of Title VII.
A. The NLRA-Proving Unfair Employment Practices Under the Act
'Under Section 8 (a)(3) of the Act, it is unlawful for an employer
'by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization.' The
foregoing provision does not, however, proscribe all types of employ-
ment discrimination."99 Although it is impermissible under this provi-
sion to fire an employee based on union animus, an employer is not
prohibited from firing someone for other reasons even if union animus
is present.100 Therefore, determining the actual motivation underly-
ing an employment decision is vital to the enforcement of section 8
(a)(3).
The purpose of the discrimination provisions of the NLRA is to
prevent coercive behavior by employers and unions to encourage or
discourage union membership.' 0 ' Section 8(a)(3) is merely a part of a
larger system designed to prevent employers and unions from invad-
ing the protected rights of workers. The primary "right" conferred
under the original provisions of the NLRA was the right to organize
and bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of employment.
The original provisions of the NLRA also conferred a right to strike as
a form of economic leverage to enforce the right.102 Therefore, section
8(a)(3) goes to the heart of the entire scheme of the NLRA. Unless
employers, for example, were prohibited from firing employees for ex-
ercising their right to organize a union, the primary "right" conferred
under the statute would be meaningless.103
The Taft-Hartley changes in 1947 sought to further protect the
rights of workers as well as employers under the NLRA. The right to
collectively bargain, and the ability to complain to the NLRB of em-
ployer attempts to discourage union activity, helped the unions to be-
come extremely powerful in the period following the passage of the
Wagner Act.104 This power invaded the protected rights of dissident
workers and placed employers at a disadvantage in dealing with un-
ions.1 05 The NLRA was amended to deal with the vastly improved
bargaining position of unions and cure the abuses that were occurring
99. C. MoRRs, supra note 16, at 183 (emphasis in original).
100. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983).
101. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954).
102. C. MORms, supra note 16, at 28-29.
103. The right to organize a union and bargain collectively is outlined in § 7 of the
NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1989).
104. C. MORmis, supra note 16, at 35-36.
105. The United Mine Workers were able extract large concessions from the federal
government during the Second World War by engaging in a series of crippling
strikes. Id. at 36.
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at that time. The NLRA, as amended, restricted the NLRB from issu-
ing orders based on the discharge of an employee for cause. 106 The
statute, as it stands today, represents a "balance" between the statu-
tory rights of workers and the rights of employers to make legitimate
business decisions regarding union employees.
Therefore, the respective purposes of the NLRA and Title VII are
significantly analogous. Both statutes are designed to provide a
method to enforce rights conferred by legislation. Although the pur-
pose of the national labor laws is to provide for the protection of the
rights of a representative group, the collective bargaining unit, the ba-
sic concept of providing a remedy to enforce protected rights remains
constant. Title VII provides a remedy to individuals. With respect to
the NLRA, the collective bargaining unit protects the right of the in-
dividual as that term is defined in the statute. In providing an en-
forcement mechanism for the rights conferred by statute, both
statutes seek to "balance" the rights of protected workers against the
legitimate interests of employers in operating their businesses. 0 7
B. The Wright Line Test
In Wright Line, Inc.,108 the NLRB attempted to deal with the
106. In 1947, § 10(e) of the NLRA was amended. This amendment to the act provided:
No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual
as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment
to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or discharged
for cause.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1948)(emphasis added).
107. However, the term "balance" may be inappropriate with respect to Title VII. It
may be more accurate to say that the balance underlying Title VII is merely a
concern that a sufficient causal relationship exists between the alleged discrimi-
nation and the adverse employment decision. This causal relationship insures
that the employer is protected from strict liability when making decisions regard-
ing protected persons. Therefore, the balance of rights reflected by the Taft-
Hartly changes to the NLRA should be more strongly reflected in the area of
labor law than the similar balance of rights under Title VII. See supra section II.
See also Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the "balance" between the rights of employers to make independent
decisions, existing under the narrow BFOQ exception, and the broad right of em-
ployees to be free from unlawful discrimination in the workplace).
With regard to the similarities between the two statutes, it is interesting to
note that both schemes place the ultimate burden of proof on the plaintiff. In the
case of the NLRA, the ultimate burden of persuasion is placed on the General
Counsel. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401
(1983).
However, the remedy that can be obtained before the NLRB is more limited
than the remedy for a Title VII plaintiff. Under § 10(c) of the NLRA , the rem-
edy that the NLRB can provide for an unfair labor practice is limited to the issu-
ance of a cease and desist order, an order for reinstatement, and an award of
backpay. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1989).
108. 251 NLRB 1083 (1980).
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problem of determining the motive underlying an employment deci-
sion where both legitimate and illegitimate factors were considered by
the employer when the decision was made. Determining the motivat-
ing factor behind such a decision was necessary to preserve the bal-
ance between the workers' right to bargain collectively and the
employer's right to run her business.109 Fashioning such a mechanism
was also critical to the NLRB because the General Counsel bears the
burden of proving that an improper motivation was the "cause of" the
employment decision.110
To deal with the problem of determining whether an improper mo-
tive was the cause of an adverse employment decision, the NLRB
turned to the Mount Healthy test"' and decided to adopt a shifting
burden mechanism in "mixed motive" cases under section 8(a)(3).
The Board stated that an employer will rarely state that an employ-
ment decision was based on union animus. An employer will often
articulate "legitimate reasons" for firing an employee. Indeed, those
reasons may well exist in various situations. However, where both le-
gitimate and illegitimate reasons for an employment decision do exist,
the employer has blurred his true motivation by merely considering
the illegitimate factor in making the decision."12
The Board found that the Mount Healthy test was the best mecha-
nism for dealing with such cases whether they were considered "pre-
text" or "mixed motive" cases."13 The Board determined that the
burden-shifting mechanism was consistent with the legislative history
and the Supreme Court precedents regarding section 8(a)(3). 114 The
burden-shifting procedure also accurately reflected the decision-mak-
ing process of the Board."s5
Therefore, the NLRB adopted the Mount Healthy test as the
proper procedure for adjudicating "pretext" and "mixed motive" cases
under section 8(a)(3).116 Thus, an employee may establish a prima
109. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 & n.28 (1957).
110. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983).
111. Supra note 10.
112. Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1083-84 (1980).
113. Id at 1086-88. The Board discussed the inadequacies of the various tests used by
the circuit courts under § 8(a)(3) as compared to the rule articulated by the
Supreme Court in Mount Healthy.
114. The Supreme Court previously stated that the discriminatory impact on em-
ployee rights stemming from an employment decision must be proven "if the
employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business
justifications for the conduct." NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 338 U.S. 26, 34
(1967). Therefore, the Court approved the shifting of the burden of proof to the
employer when an employer's discriminatory conduct played a part in an adverse
employment decision. Id
115. Wright Line, Inc, 251 NLRB 1083, 1088 (1980).
116. IdA. at 1089. The Wright Line test was endorsed by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393,401 (1983). The Court empha-
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facie case of an unlawful labor practice against her employer by show-
ing that union animus played a motivating part in an adverse employ-
ment decision. Upon such a showing, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
same decision would have been made in the absence of union
animus.117
C. Distinguishing the Wright Line and Price Waterhouse Rules
1. The Basic Rules
There are only two major distinctions between the rule of Price
Waterhouse and the test adopted by the NLRB in Wright Line. First,
the Supreme Court did not depart from the McDonnell Douglas stan-
dard in "pretext" cases when adopting the Price Waterhouse rule.118
In contrast to that decision, the NLRB in Wright Line saw no reason
to distinguish between "pretext" and "dual motive" cases."19 The
same reasons supporting the burden-shifting mechanism apply equally
to each type of case. In fact, one advantage of adopting the Mount
Healthy standard, as perceived by the NLRB, was the fact that the
rule obviated the need to make subtle and confusing distinction be-
tween "pretext" and "mixed motive" cases. 12 0
Second, the Price Waterhouse test requires the Title VII plaintiff
to present "direct evidence" that an illegitimate factor played a sub-
stantial role in the challenged employment decision. This difference
is directly related to the refusal to leave behind the McDonnell Doug-
las framework and replace it with a single rule to govern all cases in
which motivation is a key element. Subsequently, there is no restric-
tion on the type of evidence that must be presented under Wright
Line to show that both legitimate and illegitimate factors motivated
an adverse employment decision.
sized that the NLRB's interpretation of the national labor laws was to be ac-
corded great deference and that the test it adopted in this instance was
reasonable. Id.
117. In adopting the burden-shifting mechanism of Mount Healthy, the Board empha-
sized that the standard represented the reality of access to proof. The employer
has much greater access to documentary evidence and witnesses than does an
employee. Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1088-89 (1980). In a Title VII ac-
tion, there is an opportunity to engage in extensive discovery. However, this is
sometimes unnecessary where the EEOC has engaged in an investigation of its
own. S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION: PROVING AND DEFENDING A TITLE
VII CASE 340-51 (2d ed. 1979). However, this does not make the point raised in
Wright Line completely inapplicable to Title VII cases. An employer is still in a
better position to know what type of records will reveal the various motives un-
derlying an employment decision.
118. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1801-06 (1989)(O'Connor, J.
concurring).
119. See Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1083 n.4 (1980).
120. Id- at 1089 & n.13.
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2. The Application of Wright Line
a. Meeting the General Counsel's Prima Facie Case
In United Parcel Service, Inc., 2 1 the NLRB adopted the findings of
the administrative law judge'2 2 that the employer violated section
8(a)(3) by discharging a truck driver for falsifying time cards as to the
length of the breaks he took while on the job.12 3 The driver was in-
volved with a union organization that was critical of both the Team-
ster's Union and his employer. Although the Board determined that
the driver may well have falsified his time cards, it felt that the Gen-
eral Counsel made out a prima facie case of union animus requiring
the application of Wright Line. 4
United Parcel involved a driver who was engaged in union activi-
ties. He was passing out leaflets at work, attempting to sway other
employees to his cause. Several times the employer's supervisors
warned the driver that he should stop handing out literature at work
even if he was not on the clock. There was substantial oral testimony
that the employer was concerned about the distribution of the litera-
ture to other employees and the driver's involvement with its
distribution.=5
There was testimony that several of the employer's supervisors,
agents of the employer, made statements revealing their animosity to-
ward the driver. Several supervisors who played a role in "spying" on
the driver made statements suggesting that he was being punished for
passing out leaflets the workplace. The gist of these statements was
that the employer did not "get" the driver by engaging in surveillance
on these initial occasions, but would "get" him eventually.126 Also, the
A.J found that the surveillance that led to the driver's suspension
and dismissal was an extraordinary measure for this type of situation.
Spying by the employer closely followed the employer's expression of
121. 252 NLRB 1015 (1980).
122. The term "administrative law judge" shall be referred to hereinafter as ALJ.
123. United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 NLRB 1015, 1016 (1980).
124. Where legitimate factors are present that would justify the termination of a
union employee as well as union animus, the burden-shifting mechanism comes
into play. This is necessary to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the decision
was the product of a statutorily improper motive. See supra note 19. As with any
type of appeal process, the initial decision of the Board regarding the credibility
of witnesses should not be disturbed without convincing reasons. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Hawkins Constr. Co., 857 F.2d 1224, 1228 (8th Cir. 1988); Ewing v. NLRB, 732
F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1984).
125. United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 NLRB 1015, 1018 (1980).
126. For example, one supervisor stated to another employee that "[w]e didn't get him
this time but we will get him next time." Id at 1021. Another agent of the em-
ployer made statements indicating management's displeasure with the fact that
an employee, presumably the driver, had been distributing anti-employer litera-
ture in the area covered by the driver's route. Id
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displeasure with the driver's union activities. The combination of this
evidence was a prima facie case of a "mixed motive" employment de-
cision under Wright Line partially based on union animus.127
b. The Employer's "Shifted" Burden of Proof
In Mission Valley Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,ms the Board adopted a
finding by the ALJ that a mechanic was discharged, in part, because of
his union organizational efforts.12 9 Pursuant to Wright Line, the ALJ
shifted the burden of proof to the employer to prove that the same
decision would have been made absent union animus. Having found
that the employer met his burden under section 8(a)(3), the ALJ re-
jected the mechanic's claim that his termination was an unfair labor
practice.130
Mission Valley involved a mechanic who was hired by a garage
that was a non-union shop. When asked whether he would be com-
fortable working in a non-union shop, the mechanic stated that he
didn't mind so long as the employees were treated fairly. Subse-
quently, the mechanic began to engage in a union organizational ef-
fort. In response, his employer threatened the mechanic's job
security.13 1
Within a few hours after the altercation with his employer, the
mechanic was told to repair the transmission of a van. He did so, but
another employee noticed that the repair took noticeably shorter than
such a repair should take. Suspicious, the employee, Lewis, examined
the van and determined that the repair had never been made. He
brought this to the attention of the employer and the mechanic was
127. See id at 1015-16. After shifting the burden of proof to the employer, the ALJ
found that the employer's surveillance of the driver was not the normal proce-
dure given the circumstances. The employer sought to meet this burden by re-
peating the suggestion that the driver was suspended and dismissed for falsifying
rest stop reports. Although falsifying rest stop reports was a legitimate reason
for dismissing the driver, the surveillance that uncovered the legitimate factor
leading to the driver's termination was based on union animus. The employer's
own agent testified that he never saw a discrepancy in the driver's rest stop re-
ports prior to this time. Therefore, the employer could not meet his burden of
proof under Wright Line. Id at 1022.
128. 295 NLRB (Dec. CCH) No. 89 (1989).
129. Specifically, the mechanic's employer made statements to one of his employees
indicating his disapproval of the mechanic's union activities. The mechanic credi-
bly testified that the employer said, "He didn't want me talking to any more [sic]
other employees ever again ... saying that you once told me that you were not
going to have any involvement with the Union .... And then he replied, 'I ought
to just fire you right now or terminate you.'" Id at 3. Also, the events that led
up to the mechanic's dismissal transpired only hours after the aforementioned
conversation took place. Id at 9.
130. Id at 12.
131. Supra note 124.
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fired for falsifying work orders.1 32
Lewis, who engaged in the investigation of the falsified repair, was
not an agent of the employer.133 Therefore, even if the investigation
was motivated by union animus on the part of Lewis, the evidence had
to show that the employer was aware of this motivation when the deci-
sion was made to show that the employer violated section 8(a)(3). The
AIJ found that Lewis' actions were the result of union animus.
Therefore, the ALJ looked at the evidence relied on by the employer
in dismissing the mechanic. He tried to determine whether the em-
ployer's hostility toward the mechanic's union activities motivated the
decision, even though it was based on circumstances not instigated by
the employer.1 34
Considering the testimony and the evidence, the ALJ found sev-
eral factors present in the case that indicated that the employment
decision was not based on union animus. There was no evidence that
the employer conspired with Lewis to "set-up" the fired mechanic
with respect to the repair in question. Lewis testified that the trans-
mission repair in question normally took over an hour longer than the
mechanic worked on the van. This testimony was corroborated by
other employees and the suggested repair time listed in the Ford Re-
pair Manual.
Other employees also inspected the van and testified that the re-
pair ordered had never been made by the petitioner. When the van
came in for service at a later date, garage employees again inspected it
and determined that the mechanic made no repair to the transmis-
sion.135 Therefore, the employer met his burden under Wright Line
and avoided a finding that he violated section 8(a)(3).
D. Price Waterhouse Under the Evidentiary Framework of Wright Line
The ultimate issue that this Article explores is whether the rule
adopted in Price Waterhouse comports with the purpose of Title VII.
The importance of determining the intention of an employer in mak-
ing an employment decision is evident in employment discrimination
caselaw. This same concern underscores the decisions of the NLRB
made pursuant to section 8(a)(3). Under Wright Line, a method of
factually determining the most probable motivation behind an em-
ployment decision has been developed by using the Mount Healthy
model, the same model used in Price Waterhouse. By comparing the
method of factually proving a case under Wright Line to the rule of
132. Id- at 5.
133. I& at 8.
134. I at 8-9.
135. Id at 10-11.
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Price Waterhouse, it will be possible to clarify the meaning of the rule
to see whether it will effectuate the purposes of Title VII.
Under Wright Line, the petitioner's prima facie case of discrimi-
nation against union affiliation can be met by a number of types of
evidence or a combination thereof. Direct evidence in the form of tes-
timony about comments evidencing union animus may be used to
demonstrate a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer.
This type of evidence has several forms.
There has been testimony by the petitioner in an unfair labor prac-
tice setting about statements made by the employer evidencing union
animus.136 The Board has considered testimony about comments
made by the employer or the employer's agents to employees other
than the petitioner 3 7 evidencing union animus. Such statements are,
in almost every sense, "direct evidence" of an employer's discrimina-
tory motive in dealing with union employees. The only question as to
such evidence under Wright Line is whether the witness is credible.
Would such evidence, however, constitute "direct evidence" for the
purpose of Price Waterhouse?138 The only indication of what Justice
O'Connor meant by the term "direct evidence" appears in dicta in her
concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor indicated that her insistence
that a Title VII plaintiff present direct evidence that an illegitimate
factor played a substantial role in the employment decision was to jus-
tify a departure from McDonnell Douglas. Therefore, she would re-
strict the application of Price Waterhouse to cases where the plaintiff
has presented evidence of the type presented by Ann Hopkins. She
stated that testimony of sex stereotyping, and presumably all expert
testimony as to the effect of discriminatory comments in the work-
place, would not constitute "direct evidence" by itself. Stray com-
ments in the workplace would not justify "mixed motive" treatment
of an employment discrimination case. 139
Therefore, credible oral testimony about statements made by the
employer concerning an employee, by itself, would not constitute "di-
rect evidence" of discrimination under Price Waterhouse.140 Cer-
136. See Mission Valley Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 295 NLRB No. 89 (1989) (employer ex-
pressing anger over employee's union activity); Hospital Management Assoc., 284
NLRB 37 (1987)(employer representative coercively questioning employees about
position on unionization); Valley Cabinet & Mfg., Inc., 253 NLRB 98 (1980);
United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 NLRB 1015 (1980)(coercive comments to em-
ployee in an attempt to prevent him from distributing literature critical of the
employer).
137. See, e.g., United Parcel Service, Inc., 252 NLRB 1015, 1021 (1980).
138. Randle v. La Salle Telecommunications, Inc., 876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989)(under
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff must present "direct evidence" of discrimination
to shift the burden of proof to the employer).
139. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
140. Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989). But see Walt-
man v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 482 (5th Cir. 1989)(fact that workers
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tainly, Ann Hopkins relied on some oral testimony about her
employer's concerns in making its partnership decision. However,
that oral testimony merely corroborated the documentary evidence of
the partnership deliberations, and the written comments from the
partners themselves.
Oral testimony does not rise to the same level of proof as written
admissions by the employer as to the factors considered by them in
making the employment decision. Justice O'Connor's insistence on
applying Price Waterhouse only in the narrow range of cases where
evidence of the type presented by Ann Hopkins is available would un-
necessarily limit the application of the test. The test would not apply
to cases that would clearly call for mixed motive treatment under
Wright Line. 4 1 Oral testimony about an employer's union animus is
often relied on in the labor area, but would be categorized as "stray
comments" under Price Waterhouse.1 42
The second type of evidence that has been used to meet the Gen-
eral Counsel's primafacie case of union animus under Wright Line is
circumstantial in nature.143 A major factor used to corroborate the
"intent" revealed by an employer's comments in the workplace has
been the timing of the events leading up to the employment decision.
By tracing the events leading up to the decision to dismiss an em-
ployee, it has been possible to present a comprehensive picture of the
motivation underlying the decision. The timing of the decision helps
to establish the causation requirement of section 8(a)(3).
Circumstantial evidence such as the timing of an employment deci-
sion falls completely outside of the scope of evidence justifying "mixed
motive" treatment under Price Waterhouse. 44 Certainly, the timing
who harassed employee participated in an employment decision regarding that
employee was sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgement). Even where
there may be sufficient evidence to bring a case within the purview of Price
Waterhouse, counsel must be careful to take advantage of the new rule or courts,
which have showed some hostility toward the rule may treat such a case under
the "pretext" framework under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. See Jindal v.
New York State Office of Mental Health, 728 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
141. Gray v. University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, 883 F.2d 1394, 1404-07 (8th Cir.
1989)(McMillian, J. dissenting).
142. See Mission Valley Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 295 NLRB (Dec. CCH) No. 89
(1989)(comments by employer to employees concerning the employer's anger
over union organizational activities competent evidence of union animus). See
also Nordstrom d/b/a Seattle Seahawks, 292 NLRB (Dec. CCH) No. 110
(1989)(basing determination of union animus on comments made by employer
and the impressions created by such comments following a press conference by
union activist employee).
143. See NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, 864 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1989).
144. See Gray v. University of Arkansas at Fayetteville, 883 F.2d 1394, 1400 & n.2 (8th
Cir. 1989)(because the court characterized evidence of black employee's salary
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
of the events leading up to an adverse employment decision is not "di-
rect evidence" of the type that Ann Hopkins presented. Much like
statistical evidence of disparate treatment under McDonnell Douglas,
the timing of a decision can give rise to an inference of an improper
motive. However, under Price Waterhouse, such evidence would not
be entitled to a presumption of discrimination justifying a shift in the
burden of proof.
Since the type of evidence that has been used to meet the peti-
tioner's burden of proof under Wright Line would not be competent
evidence for similar purposes under Price Waterhouse, it is questiona-
ble that the new rule will effectuate the purposes of Title VII. The
statute only requires that a Title VII plaintiff prove that the decision
was made because of reliance on an illegitimate factor. Motivation or
intent is the key to establishing liability under the statute. However,
as revealed by the testimony of Dr. Fiske in district court, sex stere-
otyping evidenced by gender-related comments indicates that an em-
ployment decision may have been based on gender. Six justices
accepted the evidence of sex stereotyping as presented in Price
Waterhouse. In spite of this, the rule articulated by Justice O'Connor
would require documentary evidence that such reliance occurred in
the decision making process itself to shift the burden of proof to the
employer.145
In how many types of situations would this kind of evidence be
available? It would seem that this kind of evidence would only be
available where collegial decision making occurs. Such employment
decisions are inherent to limited types of employment situations such
as partnership and tenure-track teaching positions. It is inconceivable
that Congress only intended to benefit this narrow category of people
with a factfinding mechanism that requires the employer to refute a
presumption of an improper motive in making an employment deci-
sion. Even this category of cases will eventually cease to exist as em-
ployers move away from written comments evidencing discriminatory
factors in the wake of this decision. Justice O'Connor has created a
narrow rule with a limited life when the purpose underlying Title VII
discrepancy as circumstantial, the case was not treated as one of "mixed
motives").
145. See Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (7th Cir. 1989).
This is partially because of the concern to preserve the autonomy of employer
decision makers. However, this has not been a problem under Wright Line. In
fact, opening up the gates to all types of evidence has not placed employers at a
significant disadvantage with respect to employment decisions concerning union
employees. Employers in union "shops" have not been forced to retain union
employees "because of" their protected status under the NLRA. See Stamping
Specialty Co., 294 NLRB (Dec. CCH) No. 56 (1989); Beth Israel Medical Center,
292 NLRB (Dec. CCH) No. 51 (1989).
[Vol. 69:869
MIXED MOTIVE
calls for a broad and far reaching test to prove "intent" in Title VII
cases.
The reasons underlying the burden-shifting mechanism do not sup-
port the distinctions made by Justice O'Connor. First, the employer
who relies on a discriminatory factor makes it hard to identify
whether a legitimate or illegitimate factor motivated the decision.
However, the type of evidence used under Wright Line of the em-
ployer's general feelings toward an employee adequately establishes
that an illegitimate factor was present in the employer's mind at the
time of the decision. This type of evidence justifies shifting the bur-
den because the employer is statutorily barred from considering such
factors.
Second, the burden-shifting mechanism of Mount Healthy repre-
sents the reality of access to proof. The employer can readily identify
the evidence supporting the legitimate reason for the decision in ques-
tion. Although there are some rights to discovery in Title VII cases,14 6
the employee is not aware of nor has any familiarity with the record-
keeping techniques of the employer. Also, and more importantly, the
employment decision will be made without documentation as to the
discriminatory factor involved. By shifting the burden to the em-
ployer, the Title VII plaintiff who presents enough evidence to create
a presumption of discrimination is protected from having a case dis-
missed due to the absence of documentary evidence concerning an em-
ployer's decision making process. The employer, on the other hand,
will be encouraged to communicate problems to an employee and doc-
ument those problems to protect himself from legal action.
Therefore, the Brennan plurality took a more realistic approach to
the "proof problems" that exist under the evidentiary framework of
Title VII. By "abandoning" McDonnell Douglas in "mixed motive"
cases, the Brennan plurality freed itself from the outmoded rules for
"pretext" cases. Every employment decision inherently involves a
mix of various motivations. Only improperly motivated employment
decision are barred by Title VII. The only principled distinction be-
tween so-called "mixed motive" and "pretext" cases is the strength of
the inference of discrimination that can be drawn from the evidence
presented by the Title VII plaintiff. Therefore, as the Board noted in
Wright Line, the distinction is not helpful where discovering an em-
ployer's motivation is the key to establishing liability under a statu-
tory scheme because of the secret nature of such decisions.
The burden-shifting mechanism does not place an impermissible
burden on the employer's rights under the "balance" sought by Title
VII. For example, in Mission Ford the employer avoided a section
8(a)(3) violation by carefully preserving evidence of the reason for the
146. Supra note 7.
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employment decision. The employer showed that the events leading
up to the decision were instigated by an employee, and not the em-
ployer, and that the decision was based on a legitimate business con-
cern, that customers were not to be taken advantage of by employees.
The employer's interest is protected by the burden-shifting mecha-
nism itself. He must only show that he was most likely motivated by
legitimate reasons when making an employment decision. This fact
remains the same under either the Brennan or O'Connor test. How-
ever, it is unlikely that many cases will reach this point under Justice
O'Connor's approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of Price Waterhouse had the potential to achieve the
goals of Title VII, but fell far short of the mark. The rule articulated
by the Brennan plurality would free the Title VII plaintiff from the
unrealistic burden placed on them by McDonnell Douglas and Bur-
dine. The employer would be protected from incurring liability under
the statute by documenting legitimate reasons for terminating a pro-
tected person. This is evident from the way that the NLRB handles
employment cases where proving motivation is a key element pursu-
ant to Wright Line.
However, Justice O'Connor attempted to go "halfway" toward the
goal of abandoning McDonnell Douglas in mixed motive cases. By do-
ing so, the rule she articulated pointed out the shortcomings of the old
standard without creating a general rule to be applied to future Title
VII cases. Although Justice O'Connor may wish to pursue matters on
a case by case basis, that is not how the Court functions. This uncer-
tainty, and O'Connor's conservative approach to the proof problem
prompted, in part, Congressional effort to overrule Price Waterhouse.
However, this legislation fell short of passage this fall.147 As a result
147. Section 5 of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 provided as follows:
(1) DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE NEED NOT BE SOLE CONTRIB-
UTING FACTOR., - Except as otherwise provided in this title, an un-
lawful employment practice is established when the contributing party
demonstrates that [an illegitimate factor] was a contributing factor for
any employment practice, even though other factors also contributed to
such practice." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, at 2.
This section also, and potentially more importantly for Title VII plaintiffs, lim-
ited the liability an employer could avoid by meeting the shifting Price
Waterhouse burden to equitable remedies. However, President Bush vetoed the
bill because he claimed that it would lead to hiring quotas. The bill also ad-
dressed the other major decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in 1988-89.
See Dale, Federal Civil Rights Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court During the
1988-89 Term, a CRS Report to Congress (July 28, 1989). However, the opponents
of the Bill failed to account for the fact, at least with respect to the above quoted
provision, that the Wright Line burden shifting mechanism has not lead to
"quota" oriented decision making in the labor field. See, e.g., Beth Israel Medical
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of the ambiguities existing in the present state of the law in this area,
the rule of Price Waterhouse will likely return to the Court and to the
Congress for further clarification. If this issue is again presented to
the judiciary, perhaps the Court will expand the rule in the direction
taken by the NLRB under Wright Line and fulfill the purposes of
Title VII.
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